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Abstract
The first need of the risk analyst is the availability of pertinent
software to assess, in a realistic way, the maximum effects of possible
accidents such as pressure pulses, thermal fluxes, accidental missiles
formation and projection and toxic releases of gases, vapours, mists, soots
or dusts.
To be useful to risk management, this approach has to be quite simple
but also as realistic as possible. An underestimation as well as a crude
overestimation of the effects may prove dangerous.
A lot of softwares aim at this purpose. The analyst has to make sure he
is using a suitable tool. This involves :
- The knowledge of how to use it (it is usually time consuming and
depends on the aptness of the theory and the user's manual) ;
- The analysis of the tool according to its internal consistency ;
- Comparisons of the results with calculations that might otherwise
be assessed ;
- Comparisons of the calculations with existing data when possible
(experiments and/or investigations of past accidents).
This paper aims at describing the approach of INERIS which began five
years ago, and still goes on, working for French Ministry of Environment,
about testing the ability of software to assess consequences of given
scenarios.
Our point of view is that of the user who intends to use a reliable tool.
Introduction
A number of works exist, that aim at assessing the reliability of
software, by means of comparisons with existing data (especially results
from experiments). For instance, S.R. Hanna (Earth Tech, USA) has been
comparing well known experimental data (Burro, Coyote, Desert Tortoise,
Goldfish...) for many years with a great number of softwares [1]. The
European Authorities have taken such an initiative more recently, by means
of European Projects (see [2]), dealing with the evaluation of effects from
major industrial hazards, by constituting a large data base.
But it is not easy to realise a parametrized evaluation by means of
experimental data. There are two reasons for that state of affair :
1) There is a need of data that were obtained under exactly the same
protocol and ambient conditions. Such a requirement is very
difficult to fulfil, because of the numerous various sources of data
available, and the variation of ambient conditions from a day to
another ;
2) There is a need for more data. But there are expensive to get
(especially far field data from dispersion experiments).
That is why such useful experimental comparisons had to be completed
by another approach, which is part of the Evaluation Model Protocol
recently elaborated by the Model Evaluation Group on Heavy Gas
Dispersion of the European Community [3]. This approach is named
« Scientific Assessment », and is part of the approach which INERIS began
five years ago with French Ministry of Environment.
The context of the need of such an evaluation approach at INERIS is
described in the first part of this paper.
The second one deals with the methods used to assess a software in risk
analysis.
The third one is an illustration of two points :
l ) I t shows the way INERIS works to evaluate software ;
2) It points out the evolution that can exist between the two versions
of the same software.
1- Context of risk analysis
This context has been described in a previous paper [4]. For a long
time, INERIS has been interested in prevention and protection against the
effects of fires and explosions in industrial facilities in various sectors, as
well as in accidents investigations.
When carrying out such an accident analysis, as well as in assessing
hazards related to a process, it is essential to use different types of
computation tools to calculate effects, in order to be quite simple but also
as realistic as possible.
To perform such calculations of effects, INERIS developed and uses its
own tools to calculate for instance explosion effects, projections of debris,
or radiative effects of pool fires.
On the other hand, INERIS had to consider commercially available
softwares.
In this case, one of the first cares of the analyst is to make sure he is
using a suitable validated tool. That is why INERIS, with the French
Ministry of Environment, initiated a methodology of assessment of
softwares in risk analysis.
First of all, the point of view is that of a user who wants to be sure he
is using a suitable tool. Thus, there is a need to consider the following
questions :
* Easiness to use the software,
* Internal consistency of the tool,
* Consistency of the results as compared with calculations which
might be otherwise assessed,
* Comparisons with available data (experiments, investigations of
accidents).
One or a few versions of the following softwares : CAMEO, PAMPA,
CHARM, TRACE, PHAST, WHAZAN have been considered since 1991 [5].
The methodology of assessment is described in the following part.
2- Methodology of software assessment
This methodology can be illustrated by the following scheme (see






5- Comparisons with existing data
1- User friendliness
2- Quality of data base
3- Internal consistency
Fig. 1 : This method for evaluating softwares concerns the whole package, that is
the software itself + the user's manual + the theory guide.
The positioning allows to define the precise scope of risk analysis in
which a software works. At the beginning of 1994, about 140 softwares
were recorded in various areas : toxic releases in water and in air (the most
numerous), gas explosions...(see [6]).
The admissibility allows us to choose quickly (within a month) a few
softwares in a large market that may be assessed more completely.
Finally, the evaluation itself is performed within a few months, and
concerns the whole package (software, user's manual and theory guide).
The following points are studied :
l)User friendliness of the package ;
2) Quality of the data base ;
3) Internal consistency of the software ;
4) comparisons with calculations that can be assessed independently.
There are different ways to perform those comparisons. The risk
analyst may either perform a scientific assessment (i.e.; a
parametrized study) or compare the results with a few given
scenarios of industrial accidents from which consequences are
known (see [5 ; 7]) or compare the results with experimental data.
2.1- Positioning
The purpose for positioning softwares in risk analysis is that the user
has a general view on a large market in a restricted area (see [6]). It also
allows the user to know how many softwares are able to deal with the
particular uses he or she intends.
That is why some information was sought at a given time on given
versions of given softwares.
There are several criteria that allows the positioning of a tool.
2.1.1- BASIC CRITERIA
Before buying a software, the user must answer a few questions about
the origin of the software and its first purpose. An other question related to
the origin pertains to the relevancy of answers the user may obtain. The age
as illustrated in figure 2 hereafter, the cost of the package and the hardware
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Fig. 2 : Scheme illustrating different possible classifications in families of
softwares.
2.1.2- SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA
They are difficult to define precisely. But some questions seem to be
interesting to consider systematically. For instance, the user can wonder
whether the aftersales services are competitive or not. In particular, does a
hot line exist ?
2.1.3- SPECIFIC CRITERIA ABOUT SOFTWARES ON GAS DISPERSION
The points to be looked at are :
* The models used (Gaussian, box, Lagrangian),
* The source term definition,
* The number of chemicals in the data base.
2.2- Admissibility
2.2.1- MAIN ASPECTS OF ADMISSIBILITY
Admissibility is made of three indissociable parts :
The Theory Guide, which has to be considered under the following
points:
* Its pertinency related to the version of the software that is
evaluated,
* The accurate description of the hypothesis and ways of modelling,
* The definition of the limitations and of the areas of competence
of the models,
* The quotation of the sources and references.
The user's manual, which has to be read bearing in mind the following
points:
* Precise descriptions of all the parameters,
* Relevancy and pedagogical features of the examples,
* Exhaustiveness of the explanations of the available functions,
* Completeness of the informations to enable the user to run the
case he intends to assess.
The software itself, which is considered under 150 tests performed by
INERIS. These tests aim at assessing the physical consistency of the
software. They are about source term, dispersion and flammable properties,
and aim at comparing results from software with theory. Their contents and
philosophy are described and illustrated in the next.
Generally speaking, the software is considered as admissible when :
a) the answers related to the manuals are generally positive ;
b) the tests don't point out a lot of inconsistencies.
Then, if admissible, the software is fully evaluated.
2.2.2- EXAMPLE RELA TED TO ADMISSIBILITY
The hereafter example is source term test n°18. The aim of this test is
to make sure the results related to mass flow rate, discharge velocity and
temperature are close when considering a saturated tank or a padded one,
the pressure in the gaseous part of which is equal to the saturated pressure.
Test n°18
#**
Continuous release of gas
***
Leak through an orifice





Tank head :10 m
Height of leakage : 0 m
<t> orifice : 500 mm
Patm : 1 bar
Amount released : 1 Ton
Reservoir 1 : "Saturated"
P = 2.66 barg T = 273 K
Reservoir 2 : "Padded"
P = 2.66 barg T = 273 K
Theory
* * *
Results (flow mass rate, discharge
velocity, temperature) are to be nearly the
same.
Reservoir













Results are nearly the same
2.3- Evaluation
This step is in fact a full development of the work performed during the
admissibility phases. All the following points are thoroughly considered (A
to D), and a dialogue is held with the seller of the software on the aspects
on which the package seems to be inconsistent.
The final report of the evaluation takes into account the positioning and
admissibility parts, under the following scheme :
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A- USER FRIENDLINESS OF THE SOFTWARE
Use of the software
The steps of installation must be clearly defined in the manuals, and it
is necessary to have an efficient help from the retailer.
The user must be interested in the conditions of use : see the basic
criteria for positioning a software. This point includes also a question
related to the ease to install the software in the computer.
The software itself must be clearly built, and the results have to be
clearly explained and referenced. Also convenient is the possibility for the
user to store in memory the cases studied. We could illustrate these points
in a previous paper [4].
Quality of tools to assess phenomenon evolution
Another point of concern in user-friendliness of the examined version of the
software is related to the quality of tools available to assess phenomenon
evolution.
Error messages, guard-rails and limitations of the models
Another point with regard to the user-friendliness of the version examined
is related to the error messages and the presence of guard-rails testing the
physical consistency of the data introduced to calculate a case, in relation
with the description of the limitations of the models.
B - QUALITY OF DATA BASE
One function of the softwares used is to give the physical properties of
species involved in the study, in order to allow calculations.
For the analyst, the main features of the data base are the number of species
involved and their nature, the ease with which to create a mix of species of
the base, to add new species or to modify a property, the capacity of the
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data base for constituting a library of physical properties, and, finally, the
completeness of the base concerning toxicity.
C - INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF SOFTWARE
The purpose of this part of the examination is to make sure the tool the
analyst uses is consistent. Problems of consistency may arise about several
topics.
Consistency in the software architecture
These pertains to the results that have to be the same - or nearly the
same - whatever the ways of dealing with the case are choosen.
These problems of consistency are mainly relevant when, for
instance, flammable properties and modelling have been added on a
software built initially to deal with dispersion.
Boundary problems
The main points of consistency arise at the boundary of domains where
continuity must be fulfilled, according to the question «when physical
conditions are very close, are the results close ?».
The problems may arise according to several boundaries and the results
pertain mainly to calculation of source term and dispersion.
1) In a phenomenon itself
2) When the conditions given are close to those of a change of state
3) When the different conditions vary continuously
4) When conditions are close to the boundary of different modelling
domains
5) Lastly, when the conditions are close to an internal boundary of
modelling which is unknown to the user.
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D - COMPARISONS OF RESULTS WITH CALCULATIONS THAT MIGHT BE
OTHERWISE ASSESSED
For each software, comparisons are systematically made about a lot
of calculations. Some examples are given related to source term, dispersion
and flammable properties.
Source term
- Calculation of flow rate in a monophasic gaseous flow through an orifice
as a function of pressure and temperature inside the reservoir.
- Pressure drop for the same flow through a pipe, as a function of the
length of this pipe.
- Calculation of a liquid flow rate through an orifice.
- Calculation of a flow through a pipe.
- Discharge velocity related to phase. Flashing fraction and temperature of
release.
- Formation of aerosols.
- Diphasic flow.
- Rain out and mass balance between flash, rain out and aerosols.
- Emptying the reservoir as a function of time.
- Pool formation, extension and evaporation.
Dispersion
- Influence of wind speed,
- Influence of density,
- Influence of air moisture,
- Influence of roughness,
- Jets,
- Transition from dense gas to passive dispersion.
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Flammable properties
One has to note that the importance given to flammable properties depends
on the main features of the software. The investigated softwares are very
poor on flammable phenomena for their main purpose is source term and
dispersion.
When the software includes flammable effects, comparisons are made
considering :
- a given pool fire, various sizes and products involved (hydrocarbons,
alcohol,...)
- BLEVEs of propane, butane, ethylene oxide...
- UVCE related to a given flammable mass of product, the concentration of
which is between LIE and LSE.
3- An example : from PHAST 3.0 to PHAST 4.2
PHAST is a software from DNV Technica. Two non-Windows versions were
evaluated (3.0 in 1991 and 4.2 in 1995 : see [5]). A Windows version
exists, the number of which is 5.0.
Two illustrations of the work performed are given here. The first one is
about a test that pointed out a slight lack of consistency. The second one
gives an idea of the improvements performed on software between the two
versions 3.0 and 4.2.
3.1. Example of a lack of physical consistency
This example highlights some features of the evaluation. Generally
speaking, PHAST is one of the best among the evaluated softwares.
Let's assume a monophasic gaseous leak of chlorine from a vessel through a
pipe (length = 0m, lm, 10m, 100m), all other parameter fixed, let's vary the
initial pressure in the vessel (Pres). The observed variable is the mass flow
rate (m in kg/s).
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We notified that the results are within the right order of magnitude, but we
also observed a discontinuity around Pres = 1 barg (see figure3 below).
Such a discontinuity seems to be related to the connection between two
different models, and is not always scarce in a software.
But experimentations do not produce continuous results either.
In that case, the order of magnitude for the mass flow rate as a function of
Pres is correct. It is the same for its evolution. Therefore, the discontinuity
that was pointed out is only a slight problem compared with the expected
accuracy of results related to the existing models.
Mass flow rate (kg/s)
2 3
Initial pressure in the vessel (barg)
—Lpipe=0m Lpipe=1m —Lpipe=10m —Lpipe=100m
Fig. 3 : Gas release through a pipe
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3.2. Three examples of improvements between version 3.0 and version
4.2 of PHAST
1) Related to the documents
When INERIS has evaluated the version 3.0 of PHAST, the conclusions
about the document were:
- Advantage: The two manuals fully describe the whole models used in
the software;
- Limitation 1: The user's manual would be clearer if it was integrating
schemes and explanations about generic terms like :
«early ignition», «late ignition», «flash fire», ...
Indeed, the user is not always a specialist in risk analysis, and doesn't
necessarily know all the specific english terms.
- Limitation 2: The theory guide would be more complete if it was
describing the model used more precisely.
In the new version (4.2) of PHAST, the first limitation is no longer present.
A few schemes were added that help the user to understand the software
better.
2) Related to the data base
- Advantage 1: It's a full and useful base that allows the user to
calculate the consequences of the release of a product chosen amongst
59 toxic chemicals;
- Advantage 2: The first data base can be completed with another base
that contains 900 chemicals;
- Limitation 1: Some data are missing related to the assessment of the
effects of a human exposure to a toxic gas;
- Limitation 2: It's not possible to define a mixed substance made up
with a few products.
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In the new version, the second limitation does not remain.
3) Related to the source term
- Advantage 1: The models related to a catastrophic rupture
(instantaneous) are correct...
- Advantage 2 : The models related to a liquid pool development and
evaporation are correct;
- Limitation 1: The models related to a release through a pipe perform
results (speed of the flow, mass flow rate, liquid fraction) that might
be inconsistent...
- Limitation 2: The option «Vent from vapour space» is not operational.
In the new version, all the advantages are still convenient, and limitation 2
is no longer present.
Conclusion
The methodology mainly dealing with positioning, admissibility and
evaluation was applied to six softwares.
For such a work, the following restraints are to be considered:
1) The evaluation of a package is time consuming,
2) It is difficult to give synthetic results because of the complexity of the
points to deal with (user friendliness, quality of data base, internal
consistency and comparison with calculations are parts of the
assesssment of the software),
3) Only a given version of a given software is evaluated. The conclusions
that are drawn about that version are generally speaking no longer
relevant concerning a further version,
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4) The assessment is strongly depending upon the knowledge of the
physical phenomena involved.
But the advantages of such a methodology for software assessment are
mainly three:
1) Eliminate softwares the quality of which is not convenient,
2) Increase the quality of existing softwares,
3) Enable the software developer to take account of the risk analyst's
needs.
Further developments will deal with other commercially available
softwares.
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